FairVote Feed: Congressional Elections

Look to Election Rules to Reverse Decline of Political Center

Fri, 11 May 2012 08:34:20 -0700

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME)

Despite having one of the Senate’s more conservative voting records, Dick Lugar (R-IN) has not been a partisan ideologue. His landslide primary defeat to Tea Party-backed challenger Richard Mourdock is the latest sign that reaching across the aisle to build bipartisan policy has become a recipe for a shortened political career.

After a campaign in which Mourdock charged that Lugar was “President Obama’s favorite Republican,” Lugar defended “constructive compromise” and warned that “unrelenting” partisanship would paralyze American government. His remarks mirrored those of Olympia Snowe (R-ME) when she announced her retirement this spring. Snowe lamented that her approach to governance no longer fit an institution in which partisans “block the other side” and demand reflexive fealty to party.

Snowe called on Americans to see “strength in compromise, courage in conciliation, and honor in consensus-building.” But moderates are far more apt to be pilloried and purged than prized and protected. Lugar and Snowe are only the latest in a string of victims of a “do-not-compromise” stance that has been reinforced within both major parties by every new hardliner victory. Ben Nelson (D-NE), Joe Lieberman (D/I-CT), George Voinovich (R-OH), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Lincoln Chafee (R/I-RI), Arlen Specter (R/D-PA), and Bob Bennett (R-UT) are among high-profile senators whose history of bipartisanship led to retirement or lost reelection bids. The ranks of moderates in the House have been similarly depleted.

The decline of the middle in the Senate is especially significant given that its rules make one-party rule almost impossible. Because the Senate needs 60 votes to break a filibuster, moderates can assist the majority by voting for cloture or side against the majority until it tempers its proposals. They often inject restraint into a dialogue often soured by venomous rhetoric.

Yet as the divide between the parties has widened and solidified, moderates today face pressure to conform or retire. Those remaining face a dual threat: stronger challenges to holding onto their party’s nomination and uphill general elections in the “opposition territory” they disproportionately represent. It’s no accident that 2012’s most vulnerable Senate incumbents—Scott Brown (R-MA), Jon Tester (D-MT), and Claire McCaskill (D-MO)—all represent states that their presidential nominee will likely lose. Overcoming that partisan challenge has become harder in every passing election.

Sen. Snowe has rightly faulted the “corrosive trend of winner-take-all politics,” in which winning parties fail to forge bipartisan solutions. But we must go further to understand this behavior. Winner-take-all politics is grounded in winner-take-all voting, in which a plurality of votes earns 100% of representation. We have had those rules for a long time, but not with modern consultants armed with new polling methods, modern technologies, and near-limitless funds. In mastering how to win the game, we have destroyed its ability to produce effective representative government.

While not as enthralling as the battle for power and clash of values that dominate political coverage, election rules matter—they condition ballot tabulation, voter behavior, and campaign strategy. Winner-take-all influences the composition of government—who’s in it and who’s not, as well as how they get there. If Americans are dissatisfied with the latter, they must examine the former.

Winner-take-all rules today simply cannot represent fairly the left, right, and center. In a two-party system, the gain of one side is undeniably the other’s loss when third parties and independents are dismissed as mere “spoilers” rather than viable alternatives. Vilifying one’s opponent leaves voters with only one viable electoral option: oneself. The apocalyptic rhetoric and black-and-white thinking that pass for political strategy work under winner-take-all.

These tools of negative rhetoric and zero-sum campaigning translate into the habits of governing. With only two viable choices, parties are rewarded electorally for obstruction more than compromise. In turn, partisans seek representatives who will fight more than seek consensus.

Winner-take-all voting incentivizes partisanship, compels centrists to squeeze into restrictive ideological boxes and rewards the “us-versus-them” mentality moderates resist. But it is not part of our Constitution, and our cities and states are already providing a roadmap for change. In Illinois, cumulative voting in three-seat state legislative districts led to shared representation across the state for both parties until 1980, when the legislature was reduced in size and went to one-seat districts. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, the instant runoff form of ranked choice voting rewards candidates who can earn the second choice support of other candidates’ supporters.

Electing representatives interested in compromise and independent thinking in proportion to the share of voters who support them will require structural election change. Pleading with voters to support centrist politicians is not sufficient when the institutional framework of American elections and government discourages and penalizes such behavior. Rather than just criticize Congress as broken, let’s act to fix it.

Primaries Spotlight Sharp Decline in U.S. House Moderates

Tue, 08 May 2012 13:41:02 -0700

Left to right: Tim Holden and Jason Altmire

Pennsylvania’s April 24 primary lacked the anticipated fireworks between Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum in the Republican presidential race, but results on the Democratic side may have a far more lasting impact: they underscore the disappearing center in American politics. Two Blue Dog Democrats*, Jason Altmire and Tim Holden, were defeated by more mainstream Democrats. After 20 years of victories in Republican-leaning districts, Holden fell to newcomer Matt Cartwright in a district drawn to be much more Democratic, while Altmire was upset by his colleague Rep. Mark Critz† in a race that, because of redistricting, featured two incumbents battling over one seat.

Both Cartwright and Critz received strong support from unions and other progressive groups, which sought to defeat Holden and Altmire because of their opposition to President Obama’s health care and climate change legislation. In other words, the party’s base organized against Holden and Altmire because their voting records were not sufficiently orthodox. While the Tea Party’s targeting of moderate Republicans in 2010 and 2012 has received the most media attention, the Pennsylvania results indicate a similar (and arguably just as strong) tendency in the Democratic Party.

Indeed, the Democrats’ Blue Dog caucus—a barometer of moderate strength—had its numbers reduced by more than half, from 54 to 26, in the 2010 election, in which Republicans made most of their gains in the Republican-leaning districts that wee disproportionately represented by Blue Dogs. The Washington Post reports that primary defeats and retirements are expected to reduce the caucus by at least eight more members by next year.

Although it is no surprise that a party’s most fervent supporters would desire “faithful” representatives ready to stand up for their core principles, the decline of moderates in Congress is worrisome, with Senate moderates also under attack. Although a minority in both major parties, moderate voters exist in large numbers that deserve representation. Furthermore, the political center is necessary to the health of a democratic system, especially one like ours grounded in checks and balances across branches of government.

Moderates, for instance, can serve as bridges between the two parties, swinging to the majority or away from it in order to develop policy that is more temperate. They also inject civility into a poisonous discourse. But we are in a vicious cycle: the decline of moderates causes each party to become more polarized and isolated, which in turn, only further accelerates the decline of moderates. With the center under attack, moderates face pressure to conform or perish.

Whatever one may think of Holden and Altmire, it is critical for a political system to reflect the wide range of viewpoints; such is the essence of a democratic system. Yet, our current election framework disadvantages moderate candidates and the voters that back them. As manipulated by modern campaign consultants, winner-take-all rules (in which a plurality of votes wins 100% of representation) encourage partisanship, zero-sum thinking, apocalyptic rhetoric, and negative campaigning—since only one side can win in a given congressional district.

As such, winner-take-all creates a political environment inhospitable to compromise, as it forces centrist politicians to fit themselves into narrow ideological boxes. Clearly, we need rules in place that reflect nuances and partisan gradations, rather than the “two-sizes-fit-all” mentality of winner-take-all. The most natural alterative to winner-take-all elections at the U.S. House level is proportional representation, a system in which like-minded voters can elect candidates in proportion to their share of the overall vote.

FairVote advocates for candidate-based, American forms of proportional representation, what we call “fair voting,” in which voters would elect several representatives in larger “super districts” with voting methods in which 51% of votes wins most seats, but not all. The key is that fair voting plans lower the threshold of votes necessary to win a seat and create opportunities for an array of opinions to be represented within a given super-district. This contrasts sharply with winner-take-all, in which the candidate with the most votes wins and his or her voters receive representation while everyone else gets nothing.

By fairly representing the left, right, and center in any given super district, fair voting would liberate moderate candidates from pressures to conform. With the threshold lowered, moderates could focus on targeted appeals to their core constituency, including a mix of centrist independents and more partisan voters. Both Holden and Altmire were targeted by a Democratic base that demanded fealty to party. It is not terribly difficult to imagine the way in which proportionality could have freed them from these pressures—and given voters in these districts a centrist alternative to the traditional partisan-Democrat-versus-partisan-Republican race set for November.

Fair voting would also weaken the power of partisan redistricting. Winner-take-all makes gerrymandering a particularly potent tool; without those underlying “if-you-win-I-lose, if-I-win-you-lose” rules in place, its power is diminished. Both Holden and Altmire faced difficult roads to reelection, in part, because of redistricting. Pennsylvania Republicans controlled redistricting and packed more Democrats into Holden’s district in order to help Republicans in adjoining districts—thereby making the district less hospitable to Holden’s unique brand of moderation and exposing him to a primary challenge. Altmire, meanwhile, was paired in a district with fellow incumbent Critz. Under fair voting, the Republican’s strategic cartography would have been without purpose and Holden, Altmire, and their opponents all would have a chance to win seats. Fair voting allows such shared representation.

It is time for structural election change. Election rules greatly impact the composition of government—who is in it and who is not, as well as how they get there. If Americans are dissatisfied with the latter—and polls consistently indicate they are—then they must examine the former. Clearly winner-take-all amplifies partisanship and polarization in Congress; it is therefore antagonistic toward the goal of achieving a more collaborative and collegial legislature. Blue Dog Democrats like Holden and Altmire are struggling to survive, while most moderate Republicans were long ago pushed out of Congress. To ensure fair representation in Congress, we must act before all bridges between the parties in Congress have been burned.

* The National Journal’s vote rankings of members of Congress places Altmire (187) and Holden (186) as the fourth and fifth most conservative of the 190 Democrats in the U.S. House; only representatives Dan Boren (OK-2), Mike Ross (AR-4), and Jim Matheson (UT-2) posted records that were more moderate. Both Boren and Ross have decided not to seek reelection in 2012.

† Relative to Altmire, Critz is more liberal. The National Journal’s vote rankings of members of Congress places Critz (169) as the 22nd most conservative Democrat in the U.S. House. While this would arguably place Critz among the party’s Blue Dogs, he is not a member of the Blue Dog caucus.

Snowe-ball Effect: How the Loss of Yet another Congressional Moderate Makes the Case for Election Reform

Tue, 24 Apr 2012 14:30:27 -0700

The Senate’s Moderates under Assault as Polarization and Partisanship Increase

Admonishing the U.S. Senate for “dysfunction and political polarization,” Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), who throughout her career often received praise for eschewing party orthodoxy and embracing bipartisanship, announced on March 1 that she would not stand for a fourth term. In explaining her decision, Snowe wrote that her unique brand of moderation no longer fit an institution in which ideologues, laboring to “block the other side” and demanding reflexive fealty to party, ruled the roost.

In her statement, Snowe reiterated the importance of bipartisanship. “There is not only strength in compromise, courage in conciliation and honor in consensus-building,” she insisted, “but also a political reward for following these tenets.” Or at least, she might have added, there should be. Unfortunately, recent elections and retirements have demonstrated that moderates are more apt to be pilloried and purged than prized and protected. Snowe is simply the latest example in an increasing “no-more-moderates” trend that has only intensified as the ideological gulf between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats in the Senate has widened. Consider the following recent examples:

Sen. Ben Nelson (D, NE) – to retire in 2013; Nelson would have faced a robust 2012 general election challenge in a heavily Republican state
Sen. Joe Lieberman (D, CT) – to retire in 2013; Lieberman—the Democratic Party’s vice presidential nominee in 2000—lost in the 2006 Democratic primary to liberal challenger Ned Lamont, but nevertheless won the general election as an independent
Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D, AR) – defeated in the 2010 general election after barely besting liberal challenger Bill Halter in the Democratic primary
Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R, RI) – defeated in the 2006 general election after barely besting conservative challenger Steve Laffey in the Republican primary; in 2010, Chafee was elected governor as an independent in a fractured three-way race
Sen. Arlen Specter (R/D, PA) – switched parties in 2009 to avoid conservative challenger Pat Toomey in the 2010 Republican primary; Specter nevertheless lost the 2010 Democratic primary to Joe Sestak
Sen. Bob Bennet (R, UT) – despite a conservative track record, Bennett was accused by Utah Republicans of being too moderate; they defeated his 2010 bid for re-election at the state convention
Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R, AK) – lost the 2010 Republican primary to conservative challenger Joe Miller; Murkowski beat the odds, winning the general election as an independent write-in candidate
Rep. Mike Castle (R, DE) – though not an incumbent senator, the long-time House member was considered a lock for the general election, but lost the Republican primary to conservative challenger Christine O’Donnell

Image: New York Times

Whether defeated electorally or departing for retirement, the common theme among these aforementioned moderates is that all faced disillusionment within their own party among the base and, therefore, were susceptible to primary challenges—from the right for Republicans and the left for Democrats. When bases feel energized and confident, as did liberals in 2006 and conservatives in 2010, moderates within their respective party coalition are apt to feel intra-party pressures to embrace party orthodoxy, in order to mollify critics within the party. While some moderates such as Montana’s Max Baucus (D) and Maine’s Susan Collins (R) have been fortunate enough to avoid robust primary challenges, such individuals are the exceptions that seemingly prove the rule.

Nothing highlights the power of a dissatisfied base more than an incumbent moderate who loses the primary despite representing a “safe” state regularly won by their party at the presidential level—Republicans in “red states” (Bennett, Murkowski) and Democrats in “blue states” (Lieberman). For these individuals, victory in the general election was relatively assured—provided they could survive a primary from a base recognizing the party’s nominee could become more orthodox without jeopardizing the “safe” status of the seat.

From Left: Ben Nelson, Joe Lieberman, Blanche Lincoln

The above list also demonstrates that many moderates today face a dual threat: not only difficulty in winning their party’s nomination as the ideological gulf between them and the base widens, but also difficulty in winning the general election. This is particularly the case for individuals hailing from states within “opposition territory”—moderate Republicans in Democratic “blue states” (Snowe, Chafee, Castle) and moderate Democrats in Republican “red states” (Nelson, Lincoln)—in which their party was the minority in federal races. As such, these individuals were vulnerable to not only primary but also general election challenges. Such is in marked contrast to the past, as Senate moderates historically were able win and hold seats in states the other party dominated at the presidential level, including southern Democrats and northeastern Republicans. However, as polarization has increased, such occurrences have become exceedingly rare.

The electoral stage at which a particular moderate stumbled notwithstanding, it is clear that this group of politicians faces recurrent pressure to conform or perish. While Snowe, Nelson, and Lieberman have exited the electoral stage, others have not. Indeed, many of the most vulnerable incumbent Senators in 2012 are moderates who represent “opposition territory” states: Scott Brown (R) in Massachusetts, Jon Tester (D) in Montana, and Claire McCaskill (D) in Missouri. Veteran Republicans Richard Lugar of Indiana and Orrin Hatch of Utah, both accused of being too moderate for their conservative states, face tough primary challenges from the right of their party. As presidential candidate (and moderate) Jon Huntsman quipped this week when discussing his struggles within the GOP, “This is what [a party does] in China on party matters if you talk off script.” While obviously hyperbolic, Huntsman’s quote nevertheless highlights the way in which a party’s demand for ideological homogeneity and desire to speak with one, official voice can potentially trouble a political system.

From Left: Lincoln Chafee, Arlen Specter, Bob Bennett

Yet moderates, whether liberal Republicans or conservative Democrats, are essential to the health of a functioning democracy, especially given Senate filibuster rules that make one-party rule almost impossible. In a closely divided Senate, moderate members can act as swing votes, forcing the majority leadership to temper its proposals as it patches together a winning coalition. In a Senate in which one party has a sizable majority, albeit shy of the 60-vote supermajority required to break the filibuster, moderates can cross the aisle and end the deadlock. Moderates also can inject civility and restraint into a discourse too often soured by animus and venomous rhetoric.

How Election Rules Affect the Political Fortunes of Moderates

Snowe’s retirement immediately whipped the political punditocracy into frenzy. It would be a mistake, however, should Snowe’s clarion call, which warned of a paralyzed legislature, lamented a moribund public discourse, and spoke of the need for reform, be lost in the resulting tumult. It is essential for Americans not only to grapple with the question of why our polity has mutated into a creature so disquieting, but also to strike at the root of the cause. That root, as Snowe adroitly noted, is the “corrosive trend of winner-take-all politics,” to which she attributes the prevalence of zero-sum tactics and “brinkmanship” in Congress.

Winner-take-all politics, in turn, are linked inexorably to winner-take-all election rules, in which a plurality of the vote wins 100% of representation; voters who select the losing party receive nothing, no matter the margin of defeat. And the rules of a voting system, while perhaps not as enthralling as the battle for power and the clash of values that dominate political coverage, matter—they condition ballot tabulation, influence voter behavior, and affect campaign strategy. “Electoral laws are of special importance for every group and individual in society,” political scientist Douglas Rae noted in 1967, “because they help to decide who writes the other laws.” In other words, winner-take-all rules greatly impact the composition of government—who is in it and who is not, as well as how they get there. If Americans are dissatisfied with the latter—and polls consistently indicate they are—then they must examine the former.

From Left: Lisa Murkowski, Mike Castle, Claire McCaskill

It is astonishing, as one begins to investigate critically our system, how archaic, broken, undemocratic, and destructive our rules are. While many Americans share Snowe’s concerns over political polarization and the seeming inability of partisans to place aside their differences for the public good, they have failed largely to recognize the contribution of winner-take-all rules. After all, under a framework in which the gain of one party is undeniably the loss of the other, it is understandable—though not desirable—that leaders in the political minority might begrudge collaboration with the majority, if such means handing the latter an accomplishment upon which it may run in the next election. It is no surprise, then, that each party defines itself in singular opposition to the other; winner-take-all encourages this behavior.

Many Americans are tired also of negative campaigns, spooky advertisements, and the regularity with which one side brazenly accuses the other of toiling for the ruin of the country, but, again, fail to examine the culpability of winner-take-all rules. After all, in a two-party system permitting just one winner, if negative advertising can devastate or disqualify a competitor, a candidate for elected office need only vilify her opponent to leave voters with just one remaining viable option: the major party that ran the attack (that, or not to vote). Simply put, the apocalyptic rhetoric and black-and-white thinking that pass for political discussion today work under winner-take-all. If you see the world in shades of gray, too bad—recognizing the humanity of the other party and occasionally teaming with it is no way to win votes.

From Left: Scott Brown, Jon Tester, Richard Lugar

An Alternative Electoral Framework that Could Advantage Moderates

The most natural alterative to winner-take-all is proportional representation (of which there are many forms), a voting system that allocates seats to parties in proportion to their share of the vote. For a while, Illinois employed a "semi-proportional” system, called cumulative voting, for elections to the state legislature; districts featured three seats each. Under this arrangement, each third of the electorate—left, right, and center—typically won a seat. Such meant that most representatives shared constituents with colleagues from other parties. The result was that moderates and independent-minded legislators had the ability and the incentives to forge bipartisan solutions.

While proportionality is feasible for elections to the U.S. House, such a framework, however, is not applicable for senatorial and gubernatorial contests that must feature, by definition, one winner. While no election system is a panacea, there is a lot to like about ranked choice voting (RCV, also called instant runoff voting), an alternative framework—used recently for mayoral elections in Portland, Maine, and San Francisco, California—that would allow voters to rank candidates in order of preference.

RCV consists of a series of rounds, in which last place finishers are eliminated and their voters redistributed to remaining candidates based on second choices. This process continues, round by round, until a candidate receives a majority of continuing ballots. RCV’s requirement of a majority, rather than a plurality, to win office is very important, because a candidate—unless he or she commands over fifty percent of first choices—must build a majority coalition, which means bidding for the supporters of eliminated candidates. Whereas winner-take-all highlights partisan divisions, RCV creates incentives for candidates to emphasize points of concurrence.

Such a system advantages moderate candidates—provided they have genuine support—in a number of ways. First, under RCV, politics is less of a sprint toward the poles of the ideological spectrum. Second, RCV usually sees a decline in negative attack advertisements, the rules encouraging candidates not to slander an adversary—and risk the ire of his voters—but to build bridges and form partnerships. RCV, in that narrow appeals to a niche of base voters is a less sagacious campaign strategy, also encourages ideologues to moderate, in order to appeal to voters outside their partisan bases—ironically, much like their heroes, Franklin Roosevelt for liberals and Ronald Reagan for conservatives.

* * *

Importantly, the habits of campaigning become the habits of governing, the negative rhetoric and zero-sum thinking of the campaign trail become the negative rhetoric and zero-sum thinking of the Senate floor. If we desire a government founded upon compromise and conciliation—as indeed the Senate was designed—then we must fashion an electoral system that selects for candidates possessing such proclivities. Clearly, winner-take-all is antagonistic toward this goal; it not only compels moderates to squeeze themselves into restrictive ideological boxes but also rewards the very “us-versus-them” mentality moderates by definition resist. I suspect Snowe’s retirement will not, unfortunately, have a lasting impact on the political discourse nor will it galvanize Americans to demand structural change. What is clear, however, is that it should. Snowe had the courage of her convictions. It is time for Americans to have the courage of theirs.

Congressional Redistricting Matters, and It’s Hurting This Country: a Response to Michael Barone

Thu, 22 Mar 2012 13:20:36 -0700

In many states, the process of congressional redistricting is complete and the new district boundaries that will serve each state for a decade are in place. In other states, the process is still ongoing, with lawmakers either battling over a proposed map or the final plan being left to the courts.

Yet the placement of redistricting in the hands of partisan actors inevitably politicizes the process, as each major party jockeys for its share of the spoils and seeks to advantage its incumbents. As a result, many Americans find themselves thrust into oddly shaped districts, called "gerrymanders," that cut like scars across geographic regions.

Though gerrymanders, with their conspicuous and confounding lines, receive the most attention, all redistricting is inherently undemocratic. There is a far deeper, structural problem: winner-take-all rules, which reduce millions of voters to irrelevancy and distort representation. Redistricting simply makes an already unjust situation worse.

* * *

Recently, pundit Michael Barone argued in The National Review (Redistricting Not a Big Story in 2012) that redistricting in 2011 has turned out to "matter less than we thought," insisting that the process is now unlikely to yield for Republicans the "significant gains" he and others once predicted.

Instead, Barone writes, the GOP's acquisitions will be "modest to nonexistent," primarily due to Democrats drawing "aggressive" maps and Republicans settling on incumbent-bolstering moderation. In other words, the GOP—hoping to protect the lead it won in 2010—played defense, while Democrats played offense in pursuit of new opportunities to retake the House.

He also argues that even where the GOP did attempt new gains, such as the map it designed in North Carolina to target opposing incumbents, Democratic moves canceled out such power plays. Barone cites Illinois, where Democrats pushed through an ambitious map, noting that the net gain between the two maps should be zero.

Barone's first mistake, however, is his assumption that the absence of change to Congress' partisan composition renders redistricting unimportant. Overly focused on redistricting's impact on each major party, he disregards its effect on voters already trapped within a troubling winner-take-all framework.

The question is where our priorities lie. Instead of chronicling lost GOP opportunities or speculating over seats gained or lost, Barone might have lamented the way partisan actors, engaged in a grand political game designed to benefit party elites rather than the people, sacrifice voters like pawns.

Barone's second mistake is his assertion that partisan redistricting has produced "pretty clean lines," in contrast to race-based redistricting protected under the Voting Rights Act, which he accuses of producing the most egregious gerrymanders and the "most grotesque districts in the current cycle."

Barone has long criticized provisions of the VRA that create opportunities for racial minorities to elect preferred candidates. True, many "majority-minority" districts are aesthetically objectionable, but race-based redistricting—though flawed—is a tool the courts justifiably use to protect racial minorities and pursue worthy public objectives within the constraints of winner-take-all voting rules.

Furthermore, Barone is simply wrong to say that partisan redistricting in 2011 has produced "clean" lines, as there are some incredibly unsightly districts out there in which considerations of race played little or no part. In these constituencies, the only driving force was political. Consider the following:

Illinois: Downstate Illinois is heavily white, so race-based redistricting—unlike in the Chicago area—is not an issue. And yet, we see lines that are anything but "clean," squiggling through the state, though far from haphazardly. Democrats calculated every move in order to create partisan opportunities, such as the sprawling IL-13 (83.4% white non-Hispanic VAP), an open seat uniting Democratic portions of Champaign-Urbana, Springfield, and the Madison County suburbs of St. Louis. Furthermore, IL-17 (81.7% white non-Hispanic VAP), with a new pair of snake-like fangs jutting east, was redrawn to favor Democrats, endangering its Republican incumbent.
Ohio: Republicans in Ohio produced one of the most convoluted maps in the 2011 redistricting cycle, with nearly every district looking more gerrymandered than the next. Only OH-11 is defensible as the state's lone majority-minority district (52.4% black non-Hispanic CVAP). What, then, explains the "grotesque" shape of the state's other constituencies? The answer: partisan machinations. Districts, like OH-4, OH-7, and OH-15—with black non-Hispanic CVAPs of 5.7%, 4.3%, and 4.8%, respectively—were crafted to protect Republican incumbents, and are blatant gerrymanders. Another, OH-9 (14.5% black non-Hispanic CVAP), a worm-like oddity wiggling along the Erie coastline, drew two incumbent Democrats together.

Clearly, in just these two states there is ample evidence to contradict Barone's claim. Across the country, state after state and map after map show the continued prevalence of the partisan gerrymander, with perhaps the single ugliest plan produced in FairVote's home state of Maryland, where Democrats drew tortuous lines with the primary objective of increasing their 6-2 majority to 7-1. To dismiss these politically motivated districts as acceptable while criticizing race-based examples is not only intellectually dishonest, it is absurd.

* * *

The truth of the matter is that all redistricting is undesirable, although race-based examples are defensible and even necessary. There are, however, alternative voting systems that would eliminate incentives to gerrymander and render unnecessary the use of redistricting to safeguard minority interests.

Fair voting plans create multi-member districts that employ proportional representation, lowering the threshold for a voting bloc to elect a preferred candidate and providing more reflective, nuanced representation. And the "super-districts" such plans produce appear far less gerrymandered than present single-member constituencies.

Rather than handicap redistricting from the perspective of the major parties or quibble over which gerrymanders look the worst, we should move beyond such an archaic framework and embrace reforms designed to make our political system more democratic and reflective.

Dubious Democracy 1982-2010

Thu, 26 May 2011 08:37:57 -0700

In this eighth edition, Dubious Democracy 1982-2010 provides a comprehensive assessment of the level of competition and accuracy of representation in U.S. House elections in all 50 states from 1982 to 2010. It ranks each state on a "democracy index" that is a relative measurement based on average margin of victory, percentage of seats to votes, how many voters elect candidates and number of House races won by overwhelming landslides.

Use the below table of contents to read the report online. You can also download the data sheet in Excel.

Some highlighted national facts concerning the 2010 elections include:

Unusually high seat changes amidst generally lopsided races. 54 incumbents lost to challengers even as two-thirds of incumbents were re-elected by "landslide" margins of at least 20 percentage points.
Landslide wins continue. In seven states, every race was won by a landslide margin of at least 20 percentage points. Only six states (all with one or two seats except for New Mexico, with three) recorded no landslide win.
High victory margins. The average victory margin was a whopping 33 percentage points. Six of every ten (64.4%) U.S. House races were won by landslide margins of at least 20 percentage points. Only 81 races (18.6%) were won by competitive margins of less than 10 percentage points.
Apathy and representation. Nearly two in three eligible voters did not vote for a winning U.S. House representative.